Quine and instrumentalism by Jarasuis, Vida
QUINE AND INSTRUM ENTALISM 
VIDA JARASUIS 
University of Melbourne 
Is a scientific theory, for Quine, a true 
description of the World? His attitude .in his essay 
"Identity, Ostension and 2 Hypostasis" indicates a 
negative answer. He argues that the very question of 
whether a theory is a genuine reflection of reality is 
a meaningless one because we cannot detach ourselves 
from our theory of the world to compare it objectively 
with 'unconceptualized reality'. Hence 
. our standards for apprasing basic changes 
of conceptual scheme must be, not a realistic 
standard of correspondence to reality, but a 
pragmatic standard. Concepts are language, and 
the purpose of concepts and of language is 
efficacy in communication and in prediction. 
Such is the ultimate duty of language, science, 
and philosophy, and it is in relation to that 
duty that- a conceptual scheme has finally to be 
appraised. 
His position here seems to be straightforwardly 
instrumentalist. According to instrumentalism, a 
scientific theory is not empirically true or false, 
rather it is nothing more than a tool or an instrument 
for making predictions about observable phenomena. The 
meaningful guestion about a theory is not whether it is 
true, but whether it is adequate: i.e., whether it 
serves its purpose of co-ordinating sentences about 
observational data and hence enabling the prediction of 
further such sentences. These sentences, which are 
demarcated from the theory by instrumentalists, are 
truth-bearers. They report on reality, are verifiable 
or falsifiable by observation, and hence are capable of 
being true or false. By contrast, the theoretical 
sentences which constitute the theory do not talk about 
the real world and so are not empirical truth-bearers. 
60 
As just indicated, the defining feature of the 
instrumentalist is that he denies that the theory 
represents reality. Given that the theory is a set of 
sentences, he denies that these sentences are true. 
Since these sentences do not talk about anything real 
for the instrumentalist, he in effect repudiates the 
entities about which they seem to talk. In other 
words, he denies that theoretical entities exist. In 
the words of J.J.C. Smart, the sub-microscopic entities 
of physics for the instrumentalist 
are not so much part of the furniture of 
the world as useful conceptual devices for 
predicting the behaviour of macroscopic objects . 
. . On this view to say that electrons are real 
is to say no more than that the word 'electron 1 
plays a useful part in certain physical theories 
which enable us to predict and control events on 
the macroscopic level. 
Whether Quine shares this attitude or not will 
determine my verdict on his instrumentalism. 
Before I begin analyzing the ontological status of 
theoretical entities in Quine's philosophy of science, 
I must clarify in what sense 'theoretical entity* is 
being taken. In the broadest sense, it can be taken to 
denote any entity assumed by the theory, thus embracing 
objects as diverse as tables, electrons, and numbers. 
Quine coins the term 'posit* to cover this 
interpretation. To posit something for Quine is to 
talk about something as if it were real. It is to use 
certain terms in a referential position in sentences 
which one takes to be true. This, of course, leaves 
open the question of whether posits are real or not, 
since to say that something is assumed to be real is 
not in itself to question the correctness of that 
assumption. As Quine puts it in chapter I of his Word 
and Object: 
To call a posit a posit is not to patronize it. 
Everything to which we concede existence is a 
posit from the standpoint of a description of the 
theory-building process, and simultaneously real 
from the standpoint of the theory that is being 
built. 
Since 'theoretical entity' in this sense makes no dis-
tinction between the different types of objects posited 
by a theory, it clearly is not the one at issue. 
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In another sense, 'theoretical entity' can be taken 
to denote any entity which is inferred rather than 
observed, whether it is observable in principle or not. 
In this sense, it can be applied, for example, to all 
suns other than our own, or to Earth's inner core, as 
well as to particles of modern physics such as 
neutrinos. Since a distinction is made by instru-
mentalism between observable and unobservable entities, 
'theoretical entity' in the second sense is also too 
wide in its denotation for the purposes of the ensuing 
discussion. 
A third sense of 'theoretical entity' is simply 
that it refers to any entity, of a physical nature, 
which is unobservable in principle. The stipulation 
that it be of a physical nature, though admittedly 
vague, serves its purpose of excluding abstract 
entities which, if real, do not obey physical laws as 
we know them. The particles of modern physics are a 
good example of what 'theoretical entity' in the third 
sense denotes. It is in this sense that the expression 
will be used in the following discussion of the 
existential status of theoretical entities in Quine's 
philosophy of science. 
To begin, let us examine Quine*s account of what is 
involved in accepting the existence of something. In 
his essay "On What There Is", in discussing the nature 
of arguments over existence, he stresses that the 
acceptance of an ontology is, in effect, the adoption 
of 
. the simplest conceptual scheme into which 
the disordered fragments of raw experience can be 
fitted and arranged. Our ontology is determined 
once we have fixed upon the over-all conceptual 
scheme which is to accommodate science in the 
broadest sense. 
That is, the acceptance of any existents is simply the 
acceptance of the theory which postulates them. So, 
one accepts the existence of theoretical entities if 
one accepts a theory which assumes them. The guestion 
of Quine's stance on theoretical entities has shifted 
ground. I now have to consider what it is for a theory 
to assume or postulate entities and, more importantly, 
what criteria we have for accepting the theory we hold. 
As is clear from many sources, particularly his 
"Existence and Quantification", Quine considers the 
existential assumptions of a theory to be intelligible 
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only if that theory can be formalized into first order 
predicate calculus: 
. . . the question of the ontological committment 
of a theory does not properly arise except as 
that theory is expressed in classical quanti-
ficational form, or insofar as one ^has in mind 
how to translate it into that form. 
He rules out the desirability of translating theories 
into calculi other than first order predicate calculus 
on the grounds that (a) parochial existential sentences 
cannot be captured adequately by devices other than the 
one employed by the standard calculus; and (b) the 
standard claculus is better than its alternatives in 
that it does as much as they do, but also has complete 
coverage of validity and consistency by the Skolem 
proof procedure, unlike its rivals. 
The formalization of a theory involves, for Quine, 
the elimination of many linguistic devices which only 
complicate, and make less clear, the theory as 
expressed in ordinary language. To this end, he pro-
ceeds with a program of regimentation, whereby he 
argues for the superfluity of devices such as names, 
indefinite singular terms, definite singular terms, 
tenses, etc. He ends up with a canonical notation 
consisting basically of atomic sentences, with all 
other sentences "built from the atomic ones by truth 
functions, quantifiers, and perhaps other devices". 
From his account of logical grammar on pp. 22-23 of his 
Philosophy of Logic, the atomic sentences have the 
forms 'Fx 1, 'Fxy', etc., where 'F' is any one of a 
fixed list of predicates, joined with one or more 
variables to form a sentence; and where 'x' and 'y' are 
two of an indefinitely large number of variables. 
Quantification over a sentence can yield a closed 
sentence. This is any sentence whose variables are all 
bound (i.e., fall under the scope of a quantifier). 
For example, '(Ex)' is prefixed to 'Fx' to yield the 
clsosed sentence '(Ex)Fx', which says there is at least 
one thing which is an F, and is either true or false 
depending on whether or not there is something which is 
an F. (Universal quantification,~T.e., (x), is simply 
defined as • -(Ex)-' .) 
Now, the closed sentence holds the key to what 
Quine meant by his claim that the acceptance of an 
ontology is the adoption of a theory. Adopting a 
theory is accepting its constituent sentences as true 
where only closed sentences are truth bearers. Since 
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"the truth or falsity of a quantified (i.e., closed) 
sentence ordinarily depends in part on what we reckon 
into the range of . . . values of the variables", 
(when starting the connection between quantification 
and the world), accepting a set of sentences as true is 
in part accepting a range of values of the variables. 
And, as Quine emphasizes in many different contexts, 
the values of the variables are the objects designated 
by them. The range of values of the variables is the 
universe of discourse, i.e., the set of all the objects 
being talked about. If any of these objects must be 
taken as a value of the variables, in order for some 
sentence of the theory to be true, then (and only then) 
is that object assumed by the theory. Given this 
criterion of ontological committment, the accepting of 
the closed sentences of the theory as true involves the 
accepting of a set of objects as existents. 
With respect to theoretical entities, then, a 
Quinean acceptance of the existence of theoretical 
entities is the acceptance of a theory, expressible in 
first order predicate calculus, whose bound variables 
must take at least one theoretical entity into their 
range of values in order for some of the sentences of 
the theory to be true. 
Now, Quine explicitly embraces such a theory in his 
essay "Posits and Reality". He adopts the molecular 
doctrine of physics, and consequently is committed to 
the existence of molecules. His reasons for doing so 
are pragmatic. The acceptance of molecular theory 
endows various important benefits to one's overall 
theory. These are: 
(1) Simplicity: empirical laws concerning 
seemingly dissimilar phenomena are integrated 
into a compact and unitary theory 
(2) Familarity of principle: the already 
familiar laws of motion are made to serve where 
independent laws would otherwise have been needed 
(3) Scope: the resulting unitary theory implies 
a wider array of testable consequences than any 
likely accummulation of separate laws could have 
implied 
(4) Fecundity: successful further extensions of 
theory are expedited 
(5) Concurrence with observation: such testable 
consequences of the theory as have been tested 
have turned out well aside from such sparse 
exceptions as may in good conscience be chalked 
up to unexplained interferences. 
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Further, Quine stresses that these basically 
pragmatic grounds for adopting the theory are not to be 
taken as a sign that molecules are unreal, because 
. . the benefits of the molecular doctrine . . 
. are the best evidence of reality we can ask 
(pending, of course, evidence.of the same sort 
for some alternative ontology). 
The same emphasis on pragmatic grounds being evidence 
for truth is found in other contexts as well. For 
instance, in chapter 7 of Word and Object, he contrasts 
the ideal laws of mechanics with molecular theory, 
stressing that pragmatic grounds lead on the one hand 
to the rejection of ideal objects such as frictionless 
surfaces and mass points, and on the other hand to (the 
acceptance of molecules and electrons. 
simplicity in a theory that squares with 
observation sentences so far as its contacts with 
them go, is the best evidence of truth we can 
ask; no better can be claimed for the doctrines 
of molecules and electrons. What makes for the 
mythicalness of the doctrine of ideal objects, as 
against the literal truth (by today's lights) of 
the doctrines of molecules and electrons, is that 
the former works its simplification in a limited 
domain of statements at the cost of m o 5 f 
seriously complicating a more inclusive domain. 
We have just seen Quine's account of when we accept 
something as true, viz., when we have good pragmatic 
grounds. However, we still need to know his stance on 
what it is for something to be true. What theory of 
truth~3oes he adopt? From many contexts, including his 
Philosophy of Logic, it is quite clear that he adopts 
an essentially Tarskian notion of truth. 
In the above we saw that Quine considers the closed 
sentences of a theory to be its truth bearers. 
Basically, this is because they are formed by 
quantification over open sentences^ where open 
sentences are satisfied by sequences. Sequences are 
objects in the domain of discourse taken in succession; 
for example, ordered pairs are sequences. Open 
sentences are satisfied by sequences in that their free 
variables, when taken in alphabetical order, take as 
values certain objects of the domain taken in order. 
For example, the sequence <Caesar, Gaul) will satisfy 
the open sentence 'x conquered y', as will every 
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prolongation of 'sCaesar, G a u l \ such as -^Caesar, Gaul, 
the M o o n , A , an apple/. A closed sentence is satisfied 
by every sequence or none according to whether it is 
true or false. Truth is satisfaction by all sequences. 
Hence, a deductively closed set of only true sentences 
which is itself satisfied by all sequences, is itself 
true. The truth of the whole set is determined by the 
truth of its constituent sentences. 
So when Quine claims that molecular theory is true 
(•by today's lights'), he presumably is claiming that 
its constituent sentences are true by virtue of being 
satisfied by sequences of objects which include 
molecules. This means that the pragmatic grounds, 
which have led him to adopt molecular theory and to 
hold it as true, are also evidence for the existence of 
molecules. This is not surprising when one recalls 
that pragmatic grounds, for Quine, cover a wide 
spectrum of considerations, including concurrence with 
observation. He concedes that all the benefits 
attributable to molecular theory are not, in fact, 
attributable to every theory; but all are prized when 
available. Nonetheless, pragmatic grounds in a broad 
sense settle one's theory and one's ontology. Quine 
makes this clear in his discussion, in Roots of 
Reference, of the various factors involved^ In tHe 
making of ontological decisions. He summarizes his 
case as follows: 
How then should we settle our ontology? . . . 
That last question is littles less than the 
general question of scientific method: the 
question how best to develop an inclusive 
scientific theory. We want to maximize 
predictions, that is, we want a theory that will 
anticipate as many observations as possible, 
getting none of them wrong. We develop the 
theory by progressive observation and correction. 
When we have to modify the theory to accommodate 
a wayward observation sentence, we have various 
possible corrections from which to choose; and 
here the guiding considerations are simplicity 
and conservatism. We prefer the correction that 
is more conservative, that is, a less drastic 
departure from the old theory. But a big 
simplification can warrant a fairly drastic 
departure. We arbitrate between t^S 8 0 t w o 
interests, simplicity and conservatism. 
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The important thing to bear in mind here is that 
the outcome of all this weighing up of the evidence, 
whether experiential or pragmatic, is a theory which is 
taken to be true. Further, it is a theory taken to be 
true in the sense of corresponding with the domain of 
discourse in the way outlined above. Therefore, 
Quine's adoption of a theory and the acceptance of its 
posited entities into his ontology make him a realist 
with respect to those entities. In particular, since 
he adopts molecular theory he must be a realist with 
respect to molecules (i.e., theoretical entities of one 
kind). 
I now seem to have fulfilled the aim of this paper, 
which was to elucidate Quine's position with respect to 
instrumentalism. Since theoretical entities do exist 
on Quine's account, he cannot be an instrumentalist. 
But, of course, this conclusion is made too 
hastily. Quine cannot be an instrumentalist, no matter 
what theory he adopts, given his criterion of 
ontological committment. For the instrumentalist 
cannot adopt any theory which commits him to the 
existence of theoretical entities. In other words, he 
cannot adopt any theory which contains at least one 
sentence whose variables need to range over theoretical 
entities in order for that sentence to be true. But 
every theory, by its very nature, includes theoretical 
terms and sentences which prima facie commit one to the 
existence of theoretical entities in this way. Hence, 
instrumentalism is impossible unless there is some way 
of avoiding such committments. 
Quine offers a means by which such committment can 
be avoided, in that he offers a device for avoiding 
unwanted ontological committments in general. This 
device is contextual definition or, as he sometimes 
refers to it, paraphrase. Contextual definition is 
simply the reformulation of all the sentences in which 
an unwanted term occurs into sentences lacking that 
term. It is used by him for many purposes, such as to 
simplify and clarify language by regimentation ; to 
define or explicate certain terms -e.g., 'tan' defined 
as 'sin/cos' ; to formalize theory into standard 
calculus ; and to avoid unwanted ontological 
committments. 
When contextual definition is used to avoid 
ontological committment, it is the reformulation of all 
the sentences, in which an unwanted term occurs in a 
referential position, into sentences in which that term 
can no longer be represented by a predicate letter 
conjoined with variables to form well-formed formulae. 
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For example, if the term is initially represented by 
' F' in atomic sentences of the form 'Fx 1, 'Fy', etc., 
contextual definition will prevent it from further 
being represented that way. It will also prevent the 
term from being represented by , F ' in any of the 
sentences built up form the relevant atomic ones. This 
reformulation of the entire linguistic context within 
which the unwanted term occurs is, in effect, the 
reformulation of the entire theory. Given the 
successful execution of contextual definition, the 
range of the theory's variables is now different. The 
range of values does not need to include the objects to 
which the term purportedly referred in order for the 
reformulated sentences to be true. In this way, 
ontological committment to these objects is avoided. 
Given that instrumentalism is viable in Quine's 
philosophy, in that he offers a means for avoiding 
unwanted ontological committments in general, the 
question arises as to whether molecules, in particular, 
are unwanted by him. In retrospect, his remarks about 
molecules and molecular theory seem tinged with 
reservations. The repetitive qualification, of 'by 
today's lights', to his attribution of truth to 
molecular theory is a good example of this. Also, his 
statement, that the benefits of molecular theory are 
the best evidence of reality (pending evidence of the 
same sort for some alternative ontology), makes one 
wonder if he would drop molecules from his ontology as 
soon as another merely equally good theory came along. 
Ontological reduction is always couched in terms of 
unwanted ontological committment. Are the posited 
molecules of molecular theory a wanted ontological 
committment, analogous to this, or are they accepted by 
Quine in the light of there not being a better, or 
merely equally good, alternative? 
As already seen, Quine adops molecular theory on 
pragmatic grounds, stressing that pragmatic grounds are 
evidence for truth. It should therefore be 
illuminating to examine his grounds for rejecting 
meanings since his attitude towards them is so 
unreservedly negative. If his grounds for rejecting 
meanings as existents are the same type as those which 
have led to his adoption of molecular theory, one may 
conclude that he treats molecules as seriously as he 
treats meanings. If, on the other hand, there are 
other considerations which influence Quine's attitude 
towards meanings, then his acceptance of molecular 
theory may well need to be fortified if he is to claim 
the literal truth of molecular theory. 
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Semantics is vitiated by a pernicious mentalism 
as long as we regard a man's semantics as somehow 
determinate in his mind beyond what mightobe 
implied in his dispositions to overt behavior. 
But why is Quine so strongly opposed to mentalism and 
the entities posited by it? His argument for 
physicalism, in chapter 7 of Word and Object, indicates 
that his reasons are pragmatic. He claims that "any 
subjective talk of mental events proceeds necessarily 
in terms that are acquired and understood through their 
associations, direct or indirect, with the socially 
observable behavior of physical objects." So that, if 
there were a case for mental entities, it would be 
just that the positing of them, like the 
positing of molecules, has some indirect 
In his essay "Ontological Relativity", Quine 
offers two reasons for rejecting meanings, preparing 
the way for the exposition of his indeterminacy thesis 
which then follows. The first takes the form of an 
argument: 
Meanings are, first and foremost, meanings of 
language. Language is a social art which we all 
acquire on the evidence of other people's overt 
behavior under publicly recognizable 
circumstances. Meanings, therefore, those very 
models of mental entities, end up as grist for 
the behaviorist's mill. 
But if one takes this argument seriously, one can by 
parity of reasoning refute all theoretical entities, 
including molecules. For example, consider the case of 
molecules: These are, first and foremost, the 
molecules of molecular theory. Molecular theory is a 
science which we all acquire on the evidence solely of 
observable objects and their behaviour under publicly 
recognizable circumstances. Molecules, therefore, 
those very models of theoretical entities, end up as 
grist for the instrumentalist's mill. 
However, Quine does not apply this type of argument 
to molecules, so why does he apply it to meanings? The 
fact that they are mental entities (according to him) 
is sufficient reason for rejecting them. Even if 
they are not taken as mental entities but as something 
else, such as 'Platonic ideas', the primary objection 
to them remains: 
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systematic efficacy in the development of theory. 
But if a certain organization of theory is 
achieved by thus positing distinctive mental 
states and events behind physical behavior, 
surely as much organization could be achieved by 
positing merely certain correlative physiological 
states and events instead . . . The bodily states 
exist anyway; why add the others? 
In other words, the only reason for positing mental 
entities would be to develop a pragmatically better 
theory, and since this could be achieved just as well 
by positing further entities of a sort already assumed 
to exist, there is no need to read more into 
mentalistic idiom than is acutally there. 
However, in other contexts, Quine acknowledges that 
mentalistic idiom does have its uses. For instance: 
We tend to think of the enlivened traces of an 
ocular impingement as if it were itself a visual 
experience similar to what was occasioned by that 
impingement, only fainter: a visual image . . 
This mentalistic angle could have heuristic value 
for the neurophysiologist, by suggesting that the 
neurophysiology of the trace may resemble the 
neurophysiology of the original sensation. This 
shared mechanism may someday be explained, just 
as the genes, posited at first as hypothetical 
bodies, were finally explained by molecular 
biology. We do well surely to avail ourselves of 
any such heuristic benefits of the mentalistic 
idiom, while keeping the dangers of an uncritical 
mentalism firmly in mind. 
What are these dangers? They are, simply, those of 
treating the mentalistic idiom as if it were talking 
about mental entities. Mentalistic idiom must instead 
be taken to be about physical entities: 
Mental entities are unobjectionable if conceived 
as hypothetical physiological mechanisms and 
posited with a view strictly to the 
schematization of physiological phenomena. They 
should be posited in the hope of their submitting 
someday to a full physiological explanation in 
turn. 
Here, Quine acknowledges that talk of mental 
entities is useful to theory; that it does help 
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simplify one's account of physiological phenomena and 
does increase the scope and fecundity of current 
physiological theory. (He acknowledges this, at least, 
if he uses 'heuristic' in its normal sense). But these 
are all good pragmatic reasons for accepting mentalism 
and, therefore, the entities posited by it. In short, 
there appears to be no justification for Quine's 
stipulation that we should posit mental entities only 
with the hope of being able someday to ontologically 
reduce them to purely physiological mechanisms. 
Clearly, Quine's repudiation of mental entities is not 
based on pragmatic grounds. He cannot even appeal to 
conservatism as such because, as will be discussed 
later, he admits classes into his ontology. And if 
abstract entities are acceptable, why are mental ones 
not? 
The above discussion was introduced to gain better 
understanding of Quine*s reasons for rejecting 
meanings. This understanding would, I have suggested, 
yield insight into his rather reserved acceptance of 
molecules as contrasted with his adamant stance against 
meanings. Meanings were found to be dismissed by Quine 
either on instrumentalist grounds, or because they 
purportedly import mentalism into semantics, where he 
objects strongly to mentalism and the entities posited 
by it. The attendant examination of his remarks on 
mentalism showed that Quine stubbornly refuses to 
accept it literally, in spite of good reasons for doing 
so. If one disregards his dismissal of mentalism as 
being based only on prejudice, his rejection of 
meanings on the grounds of their mentalist overtones 
may also be so disregarded. This leaves his 
instrumentalist argument against meanings as the only 
justification presented for repudiating them. 
Quine has, however, one other main reason for 
rejecting meanings. One reason he often mentions is 
the difficulty of stating clearly when it is that two 
sentences are synonymous. This difficulty is what he 
sometimes refers to as the problem of individuating 
propositions. He eguates propositions with meanings 
of sentences, and the problem of individuating them is 
the lack of clarity in any attempt to specify exactly 
when two propositions are identical. However, he makes 
it quite clear in Word and Object that this is not the 
reason for repudiating propositions. The reason is, 
quite simply, the acceptance of his indeterminacy 
thesis. If there were such things as propositions, 
there would be synonymy between languages. Therefore, 
there would be a question of a 'really' right or wrong 
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translation, in opposition to what the indeterminacy 
thesis maintains. So, "the very question of conditions 
for identity of propositions presents not so much an 
unsolved problem as a mistaken ideal." 
The same point is made in Philosophy of Logic. 
Likeness of meaning is sameness of proposition,_and the 
latter is sameness of objective information. Now, 
"if the notion of objective information were itself 
acceptably clear, there would be no quarrels with 
propositions." But, the notion of sentences 
containing objective information cannot hold when we 
recall that sensory evidence cannot be distributed over 
individual sentences. This can be seen most readily, 
Quine suggests, by recalling his indeterminacy thesis. 
Two theories can equally fit in with all possib^g 
observations and yet be incompatible with each other. 
Clearly, they convey the same empirical information, 
but still they are incompatible. 
This reflection should scotch any general notion 
of propositions as empirical meanings of 
sentences. 
Similarly, his indeterminacy thesis is again used to 
support his rejection, of sameness of meaning in 
"Speaking of Objects". 
So, Quine gives two main justifications for 
rejecting meanings: the instrumentalist argument in 
"Ontological Relativity" and his indeterminacy thesis. 
His instrumentalist argument against meanings was 
seen to be applicable equally against molecules. But, 
if he is in fact an instrumentalist with respect to 
molecules, his claim that molecules are real must be 
interpreted instrumentalistically to be saying no more 
than that the term 'molecule' plays a useful part in 
physical theory. This, however, reflects on Quine's 
notion of truth which was taken above to assume 
correspondences between a true theory and the real 
world. If molecules are not, in fact, real for Quine, 
he cannot aver to the literal truth of molecular theory 
in a Tarskian sense of truth, not even reservedly. 
As I will now show, the use of his indeterminacy 
thesis to make ontological decisions also reflects 
adversely on Quine's claim of the truth of a theory. 
The entities assumed by it, viz., classes, are ones 
which Quine willingly adopts into his ontology. 
Paraphrasing what he says in section 55 of Word and 
Object, classes are abstract entities which he finds 
extremely useful in many ways. He reiterates all the 
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benefits shown earlier by him to stem from the 
admission of classes into one's ontology. They can be 
used instead of attributes and relations, in certain 
contexts. Further, they are preferable to the latter 
in that identity of classes (unlike that of attributes) 
is straightforward. They help us get by with 
quantifiers as the sole variable-binding operators, and 
so are very important to the treatment of a theory as a 
first order predicate theory. They can do the work 
of ordered pairs. They can do the work of natural 
numbers as well that of the riches sorts of numbers, 
whether rational, real or complex. In fact, 
. the abstract objects that it is useful to 
admit to the universe of discourse at all seem to 
be adequately explicable in terms of a universe 
comprising just physical objects and all classes 
of the objects in the universe (hence classes of 
physical objects, classes of such classes, etc.). 
At any rate I can think of no persuasive 
exceptions. 
Clearly, the pragmatic benefits of accepting 
classes into one's ontology are decisive in Quine's 
adoption of these entities. However, as he points out, 
an uncritical acceptance of them leads to infinitely 
many paradoxes. Two such paradoxes are Russell's 
class membership and Greiling's heterological ones. 
There are different ways of dealing with these 
paradoxes, though no one way of dealing with them all. 
Consequently, the many different resolutions of the 
different paradoxes of class theory yield "a multitude 
of mutually alternative, mutually incompatible systems 
of class theory . . . each with 5only the most bleakly 
pragmatic claims to attention." Choice between these 
different class theories is governed by the needs of 
the moment. As these needs change, one's choice of 
class theory correspondingly changes. Pragmatic 
considerations now devolve around the question of how 
good a theory is, as a tool or an instrument for 
fulfilling some particular need of the moment. There 
is no one theory which is overall better than the 
others. Consequently, a belief in science as an 
evolving, unitary world view is misguided. Instead, a 
more appropriate picture of science 5is that of it being 
a multiplicity of working theories. Quine gives an 
account of what he means by this, after having outlined 
ways of dealing with ideal objects, infinitesimals and 
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the laws of Newtonian physics which all conflict with 
other accepted theories: 
Knowledge normally develops in a 
multiplicity of theories, each with its limited 
utility and each, unless it harbors more danger 
than utility, with its internal consistency. 
These theories overlap very considerably, in 
their so-called logical laws and in much else, 
but that they add up to an integrated and 
consistent whole is only a worthy ideal and 
happily not a prerequistie of scientific 
progress. The continuing utility of the 
mechanics of ideal objects and of Newtonian 
mechanics is ample reason for treasuring and 
teaching these theories, whatever their conflicts 
with more august ones . . . . 
But if pragmatic considerations indicate the acceptance 
of different theories which are inconsistent with each 
other, these considerations cannot be treated as 
evidence for the truth of all those theories, at least 
not in the sense of corresponding to the real world. 
If truth is defined in terms of satisfaction by 
sequences of objects in the domain of discourse, and 
the domain of discourse is the real world, mutually 
alternative and incompatible theories cannot all be 
true, whatever their respective pragmatic benefits. 
Truth may still be a factor, if the domain of discourse 
is not the same for the different theories; each theory 
can then be true with respect to its own domain of 
discourse. But the metatheory itself, in which the 
truth predicate is applied to the different theories, 
will have to assume a multitude of mutually alternative 
domains of discourse in order to assess the different 
theories. In order to remain internally consistent, 
the metatheory has to treat these domains as containing 
fictions, and not posits which may or may not be real. 
For example, one might be choosing between two class 
theories for some purpose, settling for the one which 
best meets the needs of the moment. One of these 
theories might posit (the null set) while the other 
does not. Pragmatic considerations might, on this 
occasion, indicate the acceptance of while, at other 
times, they will indicate its rejection. From this 
point of view, pragmatic considerations are indifferent 
to the question of whether really exists—it exists 
according to one theory and does not exist according to 
the other. The metatheory in which considerations are 
74 
being made must treat both these claims equally, and 
the only way to this is to treat the existential claims 
trivially. 
Truth, on this account, has become trivialized. No 
longer is there only one domain of discourse, viz., the 
real world, whose objects either satisfy the sentences 
of a theory or not. Instead, there are a multitude of 
domains of discourse, corresponding to the different 
theories held, where the objects of one domain are not 
present in another, and where the sum of all these 
domains does not constitute the world as it really is. 
Given this, what does Quine mean by his postualtion of 
a universe comprised only of physical objects, all 
classes of such objects, all classes of these classes, 
etc.? The classes here are clearly not the classes 
posited by any of the mutually alternative and 
incompatible class theories, since these have domains 
of discourse different from each other. These class 
theories with their conflicting ontologies have all 
arisen from attempts to deal with the paradoxes of 
class theory as originally conceived. This class 
theory certainly cannot be held to be true, even in a 
trivial sense. It is inconsistent. Its posited 
entities cannot be the ones Quine has in mind. Since 
there are no other class theories, where do the classes 
in question come from? If they are the posits of an as 
yet unformulated theory, is Quine dealing with possible 
objects? This cannot be right, since he repudiates 
possible objects. Does he have in mind some ideal 
class theory, which real class theories do not match up 
to? No, because he repudiates ideal objects. Perhaps, 
he is simply claiming that the term 'class' is 
indispensable to physical theory; that he utilizes the 
assumption of whatever entities the term posits 
whenever he needs to. This last interpretation seems 
the only viable one. 
Quine's attitude towards molecular theory has 
finally been clarified. An examination of his 
rejection of meanings revealed earlier an 
instrumentalist attitude which was equally applicable 
to molecules. The preceding discussion of his 
acceptance of classes has now substantiated that 
finding. For it is now guite clear that Quine treats 
theories, and their posited entities, as tools for 
fulfilling certain aims. Class theories which are 
mutually incompatible are equally acceptable. No one 
theory is more correct than the others. The choice 
between them depends on the pragmatic needs of the 
moment. It revolves around the question of which one 
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best serves as a tool or instrument for fulfilling 
these needs. Molecular theory is not treated any 
differently from the class theories apart from being 
used persistently instead of only sometimes. In the 
case of class theories, different classes are 
temporarily assumed to be real in that different 
theories are temporarily accepted, according to the 
needs of the moment. In the case of molecular theory, 
there is at present no alternative, equally good theory 
to do the work molecular theory can do and so molecular 
theory is accepted according to the needs of many 
moments. 
Given this establishment of instrumentalism in 
Quine's philosophy, the purpose of this paper has been 
fulfilled. His position with respect to 
instrumentalism has been elucidated. It is aptly 
summarized in these words of his: 
Suppose . . . two rival systems of the world, 
equally sustained by all experience, equally 
simple, and irreconciable by reconstrual of 
predicates. Suppose further that we can 
appreciate their empirical equivalence. Must we 
still embrace one theory and oppose the other, in 
an irreducible existentialist act of irrational 
committment? . . . we would do well to settle 
for a frank dualism. Oscillation between rival 
theories is standard scientific procedure anyway, 
for it is thus that one explores and assesses 
alternative hypotheses. Where there is forever 
no basis for choosing, then, we may simply rest 
with both systems and discourse freely in both, 
using distinctive signs to indicate which game we 
are playing. 
The most telling aspect of these words of Quine is that 
their instrumentalist overtones are not limited to 
specific theories such as molecular theory or class 
theory, but are general in scope. Whatever our theory 
of the world may be, according to Quine, its infinite 
number of observational predictions cannot be captured 
in any finite sentence which is equivalent merely to 
their infinite conjunction. 
Any finite formulation that will imply them is 
going to have to imply also some trumped-up 
matter, or stuffing, whose only service is to 
round out the formulation. 
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One only need recall the words of J.J.C. Smart 
cited earlier to accept my conclusion that Quine is 
very much an instrumentalist with respect to scientific 
theories and the entities posited by them. 
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